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MARCH 29-APRIL 9, 1865.--The Appomattox (Virginia) Campaign. [ar95_1292 con't] SPRING HILL, TENN., December 20,
1865. GENERAL: About the middle of February last I received a communication from
you inclosing a law which I was directed to carry out. This law required
preparations to be made for destroying the cotton, tobacco, &c., which the
owners could not remove, in places exposed to capture by the enemy. I
immediately sent Major Brown, of my staff, to Mayor Mayo with the document, and
requested him to call a meeting of the common council to give their opinion as
to the measures proper to be taken. After a free discussion with some of the
council, and by their <ar95_1293> advice, I issued a circular to the "merchants
and owners of cotton and tobacco," embodying the substance of your order and the
law that accompanied it. This I intrusted to those gentlemen and to Maj. Isaac
H. Carrington, provost-marshal, for distribution. Being informed a few hours
later that it was misunderstood as to take effect at once, I substituted
another, stating expressly that "the necessity had not yet arisen." Together
with Mr. Scott, a tobacco owner and councilman, I visited and inspected all the
warehouses containing tobacco, and after consulting the keepers we concluded
they could be burned without danger of a general conflagration. I gave
instructions to Major Carrington to make the necessary arrangements, and
requested Mr. Scott and the other members of the council to consult with him and
give him their views. The Ordnance Department offered to furnish barrels of
turpentine to mix with the tobacco, so as to insure its burning, but this I
declined for fear of setting fire to the city. I sent for the mayor and several
of the most prominent citizens, earnestly urged upon them the danger of mob
violence should we be forced to evacuate, and the entrance of Federal troops be
delayed, and begged them to endeavor to organize a volunteer guard force for
such an emergency, proffering the necessary arms. I regret to say but one man
volunteered, and the rioters, as predicted, were unchecked. On the night of Saturday, April 1, I received a dispatch from General
Longstreet telling me he was going to the south side with two divisions, that
Kershaw would be left on the lines, directing me to move whatever troops I could
collect down the Darbytown road, and to ride by his headquarters for further
instructions. I left my staff to see to the movement and collection of troops
(of which only the cadets and three battalions of convalescents from the
hospitals were in town) and rode down, but General Longstreet had gone before I
reached his headquarters, and I received orders from his assistant
adjutant-general, Colonel Latrobe, to relieve and send forward two brigades left
on picket, which was done soon after sunrise by Colonel Shipp, commanding the
cadets and convalescents. At 10 a.m. of Sunday I received a message from Major Chestney, my assistant
adjutant-general, to return at once to the city, and on doing so received the
order for the evacuation, and to destroy the stores which could not be removed.
All that time allowed was done. General G.W.C. Lee's division, being mostly composed of heavy artillery, was
almost without transportation, which was procured by impressing all that could
be found. All the guard forces were required to take the prisoners from the Libby and
Castle Thunder, and as the militia had dispersed, being mostly foreigners, no
troops remained in town, except a few convalescents. A mob of both sexes and all
colors soon collected, and about 3 a.m. set fire to some buildings on Cary
street, and began to plunder the city. The convalescents, then stationed in the
square, were ordered to repress the riot, but their commander shortly reported
himself unable to do so, his force being inadequate. I then ordered all my staff
and couriers who could be spared to scour the streets, so as to intimidate the
mob by a show of force, and sent word to General Kershaw, who was coming up from
the lines, to hurry his leading regiment into town. By daylight the riot was
subdued, but many buildings which I had carefully directed should be spared had
been fired by the mob. The arsenal was thus destroyed, and a party of men went
to burn the Tredegar Works, but were deterred by General Anderson arming his
operatives and declaring his intention to resist. The small bridge over the
canal <ar95_1294> on Fourteenth street was burned by incendiaries, who set a
canal-boat on fire and pushed it under the bridge. This was evidently done in
hopes of embarrassing our retreat, and General Kershaw's division passed the
bridge while on fire at a double-quick. By 7 a.m. the last troops had reached
the south side, and Mayo's and the railroad bridges were set on fire. From the hills above Manchester we watched for some time the progress of the
flames, and all at once saw fire break out through the roof of one of the large
mills on the side farthest from the burning warehouses, the flames from which
scarcely reached half way up the sides of the mill. It was considered a
fire-proof building, and extra precautions had been taken by the owners. I
cannot conceive how it could have caught in such a place, unless set on fire. I
have been told that Mr. Crenshaw found his mill full of plunderers, whom he got
out by agreeing to give them all the provisions in the mill, and that they were
in the act of building a fire on the upper story of the mill when discovered. I
tried to find out if this were true, but no reply has come to the letters
written for that purpose. If correct, it affords exact proof of what I am firmly
convinced is the case--that the burning of Richmond was the work of
incendiaries, and might have been prevented by the citizens. General G. W. C. Lee's division crossed the river at Drewry's, and united
with Kershaw a few miles from Manchester. We marched very rapidly to join the
main body, and though delayed by the swollen condition of the Appomattox came up
with it near Amelia Court-House on the 5th of April. We were to march all that
night, but, owing to the slow progress of the trains and troops in front, had
only reached Amelia Springs, seven miles off, by 8 a.m. Parties of cavalry here
appeared on our left flank, and about 11 a.m. made an effort to get to the road
on which our trains were moving past us. Gordon's corps, the rear guard, was
being hard pushed at the same time. I threw out as skirmishers part of Colonel
Atkinson's command of heavy artillery, of General Lee's division, and a
battalion of light artillery, acting as infantry, under Captain Dement, which
had just been assigned to me. These troops soon repelled the enemy's cavalry
skirmishers. Their demonstrations continued from 11 a.m. till 2 p.m., and I
retained my troops in position to cover the passage of the trains. As soon as
they were out of the way I followed General Anderson's corps, and was followed
by General Gordon, who brought up the rear of the trains, constantly fighting. On crossing a little stream known as Sailor's Creek, I met General Fitz Lee,
who informed me that a large force of cavalry held the road just in front of
General Anderson, and was so strongly posted that he had halted a short distance
ahead. The trains were turned into a road Bearer the river, while I hurried to
General Anderson's aid. General Gordon's corps turned off after the trains.
General Anderson informed me that at least two divisions of cavalry were in his
front, and suggested two modes of escape--either to unite our forces and break
through, or to move to the right through the woods and try to strike a road
which ran toward Farmville. I recommended the latter alternative, but as he knew
the ground and I did not, and had no one who did, I left the dispositions to
him. Before any were made the enemy appeared in rear of my column in large force
preparing to attack. General Anderson informed me that he would make the attack
in front if I would hold in check those in rear, which I did until his troops
were broken and dispersed. <ar95_1295> I had no artillery, all being with the train. My line ran across a little
ravine which leads nearly at right angles toward Sailor's Creek. General G. W.
C. Lee was on the left, with the Naval Battalion, under Commodore Tucker, behind
his right. Kershaw's division was on the right. All of Lee's and part of
Kershaw's division were posted behind a rising ground that afforded some shelter
from artillery. The creek was perhaps 300 yards in their front, with brush pines
between and a cleared field beyond it. In this the enemy's artillery took a
commanding position, and finding we had none to reply, soon approached within
800 yards and opened a terrible fire. After nearly half an hour of this, their
infantry advanced, crossing the creek above and below us at the same time. Just
as it attacked General Anderson made his assault, which was repulsed in five
minutes. I had ridden up near his lines with him to see the result, when a staff
officer, who had followed his troops in their charge, brought him word of its
failure. General Anderson rode rapidly toward his command. I returned to mine to
see if it were yet too late to try the other plan of escape. On riding past my
left I came suddenly upon a strong line of the enemy's skirmishers advancing
upon my left rear. This closed the only avenue of escape, as shells and even
bullets were crossing each other from front and rear over my troops, and my
right was completely enveloped. I surrendered myself and staff to a cavalry
officer who came in by the same road General Anderson had gone out on. At my
request he sent a messenger to General G. W. C. Lee, who was nearest, with a
note from me telling him he was surrounded, General Anderson's attack had
failed, I had surrendered, and he had better do so too, to prevent useless loss
of life, though I gave no orders, being a prisoner. Before the messenger reached
him General Lee had been captured, as had General Kershaw, and the whole of my
command. My two divisions numbered about 3,000 each at the time of the evacuation;
2,800 were taken prisoners, about 150 killed and wounded. The difference of over
3,000 was caused mainly by the fatigue of four days' and nights' almost constant
marching, the last two days with nothing to eat. Before our capture I saw men
eating raw fresh meat as they marched in ranks. The heavy artillery brigade of Lee's division was closely engaged for the
first time on this occasion, and spite of the fall of its commander, Colonel
Crutchfield, displayed a coolness and gallantry that earned the praise of the
veterans who fought alongside of it, and even of the enemy. I was informed at General Wright's headquarters, whither I was carried after
my capture, that 30,000 men were engaged with us when we surrendered, namely,
two infantry corps and Custer's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry. I deem it proper to remark that the discipline preserved in camp and on the
march by General G. W. C. Lee, and the manner in which he handled his troops in
action, fully justified the request I had made for his promotion. General
Kershaw, who had only been a few days under my command, behaved with his usual
coolness and judgment. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, R. S. EWELL, General R. E. LEE,
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